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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STArrE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
- vs.-
L 1~: \VIS ~LftiE·R FRAYER, alias 
\VILLIAM CLIFFORD LYNN 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIE.F OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10175 
DEPOSITION IN LOWE.R .COURT 
The appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of 
~[urder in 2nd Degree, from which conviction the appel-
lant appeals. 
STAT·E~IENT OF NATURE OF T'HE CASE 
This is a crinrinal appeal brought by the AppeHant 
from a Yerdict of guilty rendered by a jury to the charge 
of :Jf urder in the Secon\d Degree. 
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The facts offered at trial were that in the early 
morning hours of July 7, 1963, Louis Sylva Garcia, an 
itinerant musician, was fatally shot through the head 
by a firearm presumably of 22 calibre. (Tr. 130-134) The 
shooting apparently occurred while the deceased was 
sleeping in a seated position behind the steering wheel 
of a 1958 Oldsmobile parked along the roadside of High-
way 91, West of Centerville, Utah, just South of Parrish 
Lane. Charles Roger "Rocky" Bierschwal, age 18, also 
an itine~ant musician and Mrs. Barbara Haarman, di-
vorcee, were present at the time of the shooting, but both 
claimed to be sleeping in the front seat of the auto, when 
the shot was fired wilthout knowledge of when the fatal 
shot was fired. (T'r. 28, 46, 47) 
Rocky testified that when he first awoke he observed 
the defendant with a pistol in his hand "in the process" 
of entering the automobile through the front door on the 
right-hand side of the automobile, where he was seated. 
When challenged, the Defendant assured Rocky he didn't 
want to hurt anyone, that he was only looking for a place 
to sleep, and that the gun was harmless. (Tr. 47, 48) 
Rocky got into the hack seat to prepare a place for 
defendant to rest burt became enraged when he thought 
defendant was making advances toward the· sleeping Mrs. 
Haarman. He pulled defendant from the front seat of the 
automobile and be~an striking him about the head and 
shoulders with a stick. (Tr. 29-30, 48-49) Defendant be-
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p;an erying mHl asked for his gun back. Rocky checked 
tlw pbtol, found it t'mpty, and returned it to defendant. 
lt wa~ then agrPPd that defendant should be given a ride 
into ~alt Lake City. ('Tr. 29-31, 48-52) 
\YIH'n Rocky :and l\1rs. Haarman attempted to awaken 
dt't'Pa~Pd tlwy found him to be unconscious and di'Scover-
Pd traeP~ of blood. (':Cr. 31, 52) They slid deceased from 
thP driver's seat into the middle of the front seat and 
1\oeky drove to Saint Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
Tho dd't>ndant rode in the back seat and upon arriVJal at 
the hospital disappeared. (T'r. 31-34, 52-54) 
On July 10, 19·65 at 12 :45 A.M. the defendant was 
picked up in a Balt Lake City tavern by Davis County 
~hl'riff deputies and taken before a police lineup at the 
~al t Lake City Police Station ( T'r. 190, 191). About an 
hour later he was transported to Farmington, D~avis 
County for two additional lineups. (T·r. 191) Defendant 
was then formally notified that he was under arrest, 
<'harged with First D·egre·e Murder, and booked in the 
Davis County Jail. (Tr. 201, 202, 205) 
Three different and conflicting statements were 
taken fr01n the accused between the hours of 3 :00 A.M. to 
3:30 P.~I. on July 10, 1963. (T'r. 245-255) In the third 
statement defendant stated he accidently discharged the 
pistol ,,·hile attempting to open the glove compartment 
of tlw parked vehicle while searching for dope (T'r. 147, 
1~8) 
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This appeal raises for review by this Court, three 
questions of Law. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT',S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHEN 'THE DISTRICT 
ATORNEY CROSS EXAMINED DEFENDANT ON HIS 
PRIOR JUVENILE RECORD, AND COMPOUNDED ERROR 
BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER SUCH EVI-
DENCE TO REFUTE AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE OF DE-
FENDANT'S GOOD CHARACTER. 
POINT II 
THE 'TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY ADMI'T'TING INTO EVIDENCE, OVER COUNSEL'S OB-
JECTIONS, EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE AC-
CUSED INVOLUNTARILY GIVEN, DURING A PERIOD OF 
ILLEGAL ARREST AND DE'T'EN'TION, UNDER CIRCUM-
STANCES INHERANTLY COERCIVE AND IN VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE AND FED-
ERAL CONSTTTUT'IONS. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY GIVING THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER WHEN THE PROSECUTION PROCEED-
ED UNDER THE FELONY MURDER THEORY AND THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT A 
CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
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ARGP~fENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WHEN THE DISTRICT 
ATORNEY CROSS EXAMINED DEFENDANT ON HIS 
PRIOR JUVENILE RECORD, AND COMPOUNDED ERROR 
BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER SUCH EVI-
DENCE TO REFUTE AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE OF DE-
FENDANT'S GOOD CHARACT'ER. 
The prosecution cross-e~amined the Defendant as 
follow~. ( Tr. 572) 
"Q. You have testified on direct-examinakion as 
to your reputation for working, and not hav-
ing been before the authorities, no trouble 
or problems; is that right~ 
A. No, Sir. Mr. Hansen asked me if I was ever 
in prison. 
Q. Let me ask you this: Have you been before 
the juvenile authorities for things that would 
be tantamount to felonies, if you weren't a 
juvenile-be the same as felonies~ 
A. Yes. Sir. 
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Q. And how many times have you been before 
the Juvenile Court fo·r serious offenses that 
would be the same as felonies if you had been 
an adult~ 
A. About rthree, four, something like that. 
Q. Did one involve burglary, and setting fires~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Another involve unlawful entry and damage 
to property~ 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Another one involve theft of some money 
from a church in Murray~ 
A. Yes, sir." 
Whereupon counsel for defense asked for a mistrial 
{ 1Tr. 575) The court denied appellant's motion stating 
that the defense opened the questtion on direct examina-
tion and the defense failed to object to the questions 
(Tr. 580) 'The court failed to admonish the jury to disre-
gard completely such statemell!ts and in Jury Instruction 
No. 32 advised the jury that such evidence was admiss-
able "for the purpose of refuting affirn1ative e·vidence 
by defendant of his good character." ('Tr. 606) The trial 
court's ruling is without foundation in fact and without 
merit in }taw. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Defen~P introduced no evidence which could be con-
strued as putting the defendant's character in issue. 
On di n•et exmnination no reference was made to his 
jnvPnil8 rpeord. lie testified as to his age, education, 
hroken homelife, placPs he had lived, who he had lived 
with, f'onnPr Pmployment, and as to his intentions and 
aetion~ leading up to and subsequent to his arrest for 
tlu• in<'ident for which he was on trial. (Tr. 512-534) 
' : 
\Yhen asked by his counsel, '·'Have you ever been 
convicted of a felony, Louie, by imprisonment in a state 
prison, hen•, ~California or anyplace~", he replied "No." 
('rr. 51G) His stating he had no prior convictions of :a 
1\•lony was proper, truthful and not :misleading. By stat-
ut(-) juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature, 
t'.C.A. 55-10-26 (19'53), and adjudications are not to be 
drrmed convictions. 
T·rial court's instructions to the jury authorizing 
them to consider such evidence to refute evidence of good 
character is without precedence and flys in the face of a 
statutory prohibition. 
r tah law prohibits admissions of such evidence 
against the party involved in any case or proceeding 
in any court. Utah Code Annotated 55-10-33 ( 1953 
amended) provides : 
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"Judgment not criminal in nature-Inadmiss-
ible in Evidence. - No 1adjudication upon the 
status of any child by the juvenile court, shall oper-
ate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinar-
ily imposed by a conviction in a criminal case, nor 
shall any child be deemed a crimnal by reason of 
such adjudiCJation, nor shall such adjudication 
be deemed a conviction. Neither the record of the 
disposition of a child nor any evidence given in 
Juvenile court shall be admissible as evidence 
against the child in any CJase or proceedings in any 
other court." 
Under statutes such as this there appears to he no 
disagreement that the prohibition against the use of any 
evidence of juvenile court matters in any other courts 
has received liberal construction. Such is inadmissiblB 
for any purpose against one who was a juvenlie offender 
and testifies in another proceeding. 147 ALR. 446. 
In Malone v. State (1936), 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 NE 
473 the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a lower court con-
viction of First Degree :Murder where prosecution was 
allowed to cross-examine defendant as to matters which 
had been rthe subject of proceedings in the juvenile court 
and observed that to permit the use of such evidence "to 
discredit him or mark him as one possessing a criminal 
history" would be contrary to both the letter and spirit 
of the legislaJtive enactment. 
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Again in /;OH'e v. State, 63 So. 2d 285 a conviction of 
:2nd I )pgTPP H nrglary was reversed due to trial courts per-
mitting solieitor to cross-examine defendant as to a prior 
S(•nkn<'P to n reform school for breaking into places. See 
also Stole v. f{elley (19·30) 169' La. T53 126 49; Thomas 
-v. U·w~ted Sta.tes (1941) 74 App. D.C. 167, 121 F. 2d 905; 
State l'. Co.r (192+, :Mo.) 263 SW 215; State v. Morinski 
(1 !H~) 139 Ohio St. 559; 41 NE 2d 287; Berge v. St,ate 
( 19~:3) 96 rrex. Crim. Rep. 32, 255 S.W. 754; Robison v. 
State (1928) 110 'Tex Crim Rep. 345, 7 S.W. 2d 571; 
Smith v. St.ate (1929') 113 Tex. Crim. Rep. 124; 18 S.W. 
:2(1 1070 for general holdings that witnesses may not be 
e ross-Pxmnined as to prior juvenile records under stat-
tltl's silnliar to Utah. 
In Schafer v. State, 51 S.W. 2d 356 the district attor-
IWY cross-examined the accused in a murder case regard-
ing a prior sentence to a reformatory and upon objec-
tion by defense, stated he expected to show conviction 
and sentence to the reformatory. The trial judge prompt-
ly instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's ques-
tion and statement. 'The appellate court declared the 
prosecutors statements in1proper and prejudicial if they 
"could have affected the fairness of the trial." It was 
held the circumstances of that case did not justify re-
versal because (1) the trial court promptly instructed 
the jury to totally disregard such statements and ( 2) 
the jury has already in possession of facts as to other 
offenses not in the nature of juvenile proceedings which 
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showed the accused had been indicted for shooting at 
deceased before the alleged homicide and also had in-
formation as to indictments for other felonies and con-
victions of misdemeanors the gravity of which 1nade a 
minor reference to a sentence to a reformatory inconse-
quential. 
1The trial court's added assertion that the defendant 
failed to timely object is also without me-rit, and in no 
way corrects court's error in instruction. The prosecu-
tion is a quasi-judicial office and it is his duty to see 
that defendant gets a fair trial. He is not at liberty 
to raise questions for the purpose of forcing defendant 
to object. The damage· is completed when the objection 
is made as implied in the Schafer case, supra. 
For waiver see Commonwealth v. Davis, 396 Pa. 158, 
150 A. 2d 863 (1959). ·The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
where the issue wa.s not ever raised until oral argument 
on appeal, reversed a First Degree Murde-r conviction 
where prosecutor during cross-examination n1ade re-
peated refe·rences to defendant's criminal record which 
could not he justified as an attack on defendant's credi-
bility declaring such to prejudice a fair trial. 
In the cruse at bar the cross examination of the dis-
trict attorney was improper and unlawful by statute. 
The trial judge 1nade no attempt to cleanse the record 
but in fact advised the jury to consider such evidence. 
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The c.ross-t~xainination was clearly prejudicial to a fair 
trial for defendant with references to burglary, unlawful 
l'ntry, setting fires, destruction of property and theft 
of property. The defendant did not and could not open 
up the subject to inquiry; nor did he or could he waive 
his statutory protection against impeachment by such 
evidence; nor did he nor could he waive his right to a 
fair trial. A trial interrupted and delayed by the tragic 
assassination of President Kennedy. 
POINT II 
THE 'TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
JECTIONS, EXTRAJUDI,CIAL ST ATEMENT.S OF THE A!C-
CUSED INVOLUNTARILY GIVEN, DURING A PERIOD OF 
ILLEGAL ARREST AND DET'ENTION, UNDER CIRCUM-
STANCES INHERANTLY .COERJCIVE AND IN VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE AND FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Defendant at the time of his arrest was an 18 year old 
hoy having completed the 9th grade in school. He is the 
product of a broken home plagued with frequent shifts in 
residenees between parents. Substantial evidence intro-
duced during the trial indicates he was prone to excessive 
consumption of alcohol and had been drinking just prior 
to his arrest, detention, and interrogation. ('Tr. 249) The 
record is filled with instances showing his emotional 
instability and susceptability to suggestion. 
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Sheriff Hammon admitted the written and oral statP-
ments were taken after defendant requested counsel and 
attempted to obtain such. The statements \Yere taken 
prior to any contact with anyone outside the Sheriff's de-
partment. (1T'r. 229, 408, 409) 
'The arrest and detention of Defendant were illegal 
and prejudicial. He was t:aken into custody without a 
warrant, by Davis County Sheriff's officers while at a 
bar in Salt Lake City, S1alt Lake County, and transported 
to the Salt Lake City Police Station for identification. 
He ~as not taken before a magistrate, advised of charges 
ag-liinst him or provided legal counsel. Within an hour he 
was transported to the Davis County Jail in F'armington, 
· Utah, without a warrant of arrest, or other legal hearing 
or process 
Utah Code Annotated 77-13-17 (195-3) clearly pro-
hibits such action declaring, "when an arrest is made 
without warrant by ~a peace officer or private person, 
the person arrested must without unreasonable delay be 
taken to the nearest or most accessible magist.rate in 
the county in which the arrest is made, and a complaint 
stating the eharge against the person must he n1ade be-
fore such magistrate." 
Defendant was taken out of Salt Lake County with-
out an opportunity to contact friends or relatives and 
booked in the Davis County Jail in Farmington, Utah 
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whore hP knew no one and had no one to advise him. Even 
though allowed to use the telephone defendant was ef-
fc·etivPly deprivPd of any outside counsel. He had no 
funds to retain counsel and apparently knew nothing 
about. the process for doing such. When he placed a call 
to a friend asking for witnesses and an attorney the 
Nlwriff stood by and later introduced portions of his con-
vt>rsation into evidence as attempts to establish an alibi. 
( T r. 229) By the time his sister was able to get from 
~alt Lake City to Farmington and get in to see defendant 
( Tr. 207) three inconsistent statements had been given 
Ntrh of which were admitted in to evidence. 
The record clearly indicates defendant became dis-
traught over the fact that no one came to help him and 
sought counsel from the sheriff (1Tr. 203) who admittedly 
had won defendant''S confidence. (Tr. 209) Sheriff Ham-
mon testified, "I'm sure he had f.aith in me, and he 
thought I would help him, or he wouldn't have told me." 
( Tr. 220) The sheriff then advised the boy it was in his 
lwst interst to give a statement if it was an accident. ('T·r. 
395) 
Sheriff Hammon acknowledged the defendant was 
frightened and crying when he gave the statement (Tr. 
210) and didn't voluntarily narrate the fact situation 
(Tr. :?10) and thB~t such had to be elicited on a piece-meal 
basis by questions and answers with defendant first deny-
ing and then admitting numerous facts and allegations. 
(Tr. 406) 
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In several places the record indicates that defendant 
was in very general terms "advised as to his right to 
counsel," (Tr. 192) and "rtold that anything he said could 
be used for or against him" (Tr. 199) or that any state-
ments he made "should be given of his free choice." (Tr. 
204) 
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that 
he was told he had an absolute right to remain silent 
and to sign nothing in terms which a youth of his age 
and emotional development could be expected to under-
stand. 
Sheriff Hammon flatly admitted that he did not ad-
vise the defendant again of his rights when the final and 
most incriminating staJtement was given. ( Tr. 232) 
The burden of proof as to volutarinous is upon the 
State. State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P. 2d 1097. 
Clearly the prosecution failed to meet this burden and 
the trial court erred in overruling defense's motion to 
suppress such s1tatements. 
Since the admissibility of a confession in a state 
criminal case is tested by the same standard applied in 
federal prosecutions (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) 
it is necessary to look to the standard set by our Federal 
Courts. 
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Taken collectively the conditions under which these 
~tat~·mPnts WPre obtained violate due process and refute 
nny allegation that such were "·an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice" by their maker. Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 
lT.~. -H) (1962); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 19•1 (1957); 
F.S. t'. R·undle, 221 F. Supp 1003, (1963). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY GIVING OVER DEF.ENSE COUNSEL'S OBJE1CTION THE 
JURY AN INS'TRUCT'ION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
WHEN THE PROSECUTION HAD PROCEEDED UNDER 
THE FELONY MURDER THEORY AND THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT A CHARGE OF 
SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
Utah •Code Annotated (1953) 76-30-3 provides "Every 
murder ... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to prepetrate, any arson, rape, burglary or robbery ... 
i~ murder in the first degree." 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 76-9-3 provides "Every 
person who ... enters any automobile ... with intent to 
~tt,al or to conunit any felony whatever therein is guilty 
of burglary ... " 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The prosecution's case for a first degree InuJruer 
charge was based upon a statement given to officers by 
defendant declaring he entered the automobile looking for 
dope and while he was .looking in the glove compartment, 
he pointed the gun at the driver and the gun discharged. 
All evidence is circumstantial and the deceased's 
companions testified they were asleep and did not know 
when the weapon was fired or when the act occurred. The 
firearm used was never located or placed into evidence. 
When first observed defendant was inside the vehicle 
with a pistol in his hand. 
StaJteinents introduced by former cellmates together 
with circumstantial evidence leading up to and subse-
quent to the incident are in no way in conflict with the 
statement given to the sheriff and there is no evidence to 
support an instruction on murder in the second degree. 
The prosecution established the criminal agency ele-
ment of the corpus delecti by using the felony murder 
theory and was thus able to introduce the statement 
of defendant. (Tr. 164-167) Upon introducing such evi-
dence the state is hound by it. 
Under the evidence the defendant was guilty of first 
degree murder or not guilty at all. Trial Court's giving of 
the instruction on second degree murder ( Tr. 597, 598) 
over defense counsel's timely objection ('Tr. 720) was 
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elearly prejudicial and reversible error. See Ellis v. 
People, 164 P.2d 733 (1945, Colorado) ; Dickens v. 
Peoplr, (i7 Colo. 409, 186 P. 277 (1919); Green v. United 
States, :?18 F. 2d 856 (1955); see also State v. Thorne, 39 
U. ~OS, 117 P. 58 (1912); State v. Mewhinney, 43 U. 135, 
1:1-t P. 632 (1913); State v. Condit, 101 U. 558, 125 P. 2d 
sot (19+2). 
CONCLUSION 
·The appellant respectfully submits that for the 
reasons above enumerated the case be reversed and 
remanded. 
RespectfUllly submitted, 
JIMI MlTSUNAGA 
Legal Defender 
231 ast 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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